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1 Introduction
Hiring individuals with Public Service Motivation (PSM) is often proposed
as a way to improve public sector performance and to overcome incentive
problems in the public sector. In this paper we attempt to find evidence of
PSM and to investigate whether extrinsic rewards crowd out PSM.
The concept of PSM has its roots in the public administration literature
where it is broadly defined as “an individual’s predisposition to respond to
motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions” (Perry, 1996).
This predisposition is determined by environmental factors, such as parental
modelling or socialization within organizations. It reflects three categories
of motives: rational, norm-based and aﬀective. Rational motives are present
when individuals want to participate in policy-making to pursue their polit-
ical agenda, or when individuals commit to a public program because they
personally identify with it. Norm-based motives are generated by a desire
to pursue the public interest; they include patriotism, civic duty and a sense
of loyalty to the government. Aﬀective motives refer to behaviour motivated
by emotional responses to diﬀerent social contexts and are characterized by
a desire to help others.
The presence of PSM generates a number of implications. If values and
sentiments associated with the public sector are attractive to individuals with
PSM, hiring these individuals will help to overcome incentive problems in the
public sector. Agents who care about the output will have less incentive to
shirk in the public sector than in the private sector.1 This is because public
sector managers cannot commit to increase other factors of production to
maintain output if an agent shirks eﬀort, whereas private sector managers
can, due to the profit motive (Francois, 2001).2 Further, hiring individuals
with PSM will increase organizational eﬃciency in the public sector as better
1See Francois and Vlassopoulos (2007) for a survey of literature that discusses the role
of pro-social motivation in overcoming incentive problems in the provision of public goods.
2Individuals are more willing to donate labour in the public sector because the public
sector can credibly commit not to expropriate labour (see Grout and Yong; 2003 and
Grout and Schnedler; 2006). Gregg, Grout, Ratcliﬀe, Smith and Windmeijer (2008) find
that workers in the non-profit sector donate significantly more labour than workers in the
private sectors.
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matching of agents and principals with similar preferences reduces the need
for high-powered incentives (Besley and Ghatak, 2005). In fact the use of high
powered incentives may have adverse eﬀects on public-sector performance.
As shown by Benabou and Tirole (2006), monetary incentives decrease the
reputational value of pro-social actions and thus reduce the overall utility
from pro-social behaviour. Extrinsic rewards may then crowd out PSM:
whilst higher wages increase the probability of filling a job vacancy, they
decrease the expected average quality of job applicants because less motivated
workers are induced to apply (Delfgaauw and Dur; 2007).3
Conclusive empirical evidence of PSM amongst public-sector workers is
however yet to be found. Some empirical research into PSM is discussed in the
public administration literature: Brewer and Selden (1998) find evidence of
PSM amongst whistle-blowers, but their sample comprises only public sector
employees, thus they do not compare public sector workers with workers in
other sectors. Crewson (1997) and Dilulio (1994) show that workers in the
public sector report higher satisfaction with the intrinsic characteristics of
work than workers in the private sector. Houston (2000) shows that public
sector employees are more likely to place a higher value on the intrinsic
rewards. Houston (2006) shows that public sector workers undertake more
charitable activities than workers in the private sector. These studies however
do not show whether it is the public sector that causes individuals to derive
greater satisfaction from the intrinsic characteristics of their work or rather it
is individuals who derive greater satisfaction from the intrinsic characteristics
of public-sector work who are drawn to the public sector.
Further, the empirical literature on the crowding-out eﬀect of monetary
incentives has not considered the eﬀect of extrinsic rewards on public sec-
tor workers.4 Frey, Oberholzer-Gee, and Eichenberger (1996) and Frey and
Oberholzer-Gee (1997) show that people are less likely to accept that “Not
In My Backyard” (NIMBY) projects are undertaken in their own town when
they are oﬀered monetary compensation. In an experimental study, Gneezy
3Crowding out of workers with PSM has also been attributed to unmotivated workers
being attracted to the public sector (see Delfgaauw and Dur; 2008).
4In his seminal paper, Titmuss (1970) argued that monetary compensation undermines
civic duty so that the introduction of monetary compensation would result in blood of
lower quality being collected.
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and Rustichini (2000a) show that individuals exert less eﬀort when a small
amount of monetary compensation is oﬀered than when no compensation
is oﬀered. In Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) the introduction of a fine to
parents who are late in collecting their children from school increases the
rate of parents arriving late.5 Ariely, Bracha, and Meier (2009) show that
image motivation is crowded out by monetary incentives, meaning that mon-
etary incentives are less likely to work in public pro-social activities and more
likely to work in private pro-social activities. Carpenter and Myers (2007)
find that altruism and reputational concerns are positively related to individ-
ual’s volunteering to be fire fighters. They also find that positive eﬀect that
monetary incentives have on volunteering decline with reputational concerns,
thus providing further evidence of extrinsic incentives crowding out pro-social
behaviour.
The crowding out hypothesis is especially important when we consider
gender diﬀerences. Cronson and Gneezy (2009) find that the social pref-
erences of women are more situationally specific and more malleable than
men. The finding that women are more sensitive to social cues in determin-
ing appropriate behaviour implies that women may place higher value of a
pro-social reputational than men. Benabou and Tirole (2006, pp.1662) ar-
gue that if indeed women have higher pro-social reputational concerns than
men, then they are more likely to undertake pro-social actions in the absence
of extrinsic rewards. Women will also be more likely than men to respond
negatively to extrinsic rewards. Evidence of this is found by Mellstrom and
Johannesson (2008) who when studying the willingness to donate blood find
that in the absence of monetary incentives women donate more blood than
men. However, when monetary incentives are introduced, the blood dona-
tions of women drop significantly. When subjects are oﬀered the choice to
give the monetary payment to charity, the blood donations of women in-
crease back to levels when there were no monetary incentives. The blood
donations of men remain approximately the same throughout. Thus, we also
investigate gender diﬀerences in our paper.
We use data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to inves-
5See Frey and Jegen (2001) for a survey of the literature on crowding out and in of
intrinsic motivation.
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tigate whether PSM can explain individuals’ propensity to move into public
sector jobs. To proxy the utility derived from extrinsic aspects of the job we
use workers’ self-reported satisfaction with pay, satisfaction with job security
and satisfaction with work hours.6 We consider satisfaction with work itself
as a proxy for intrinsic rewards.7 Using predicted diﬀerentials for these vari-
ables, we estimate transition probabilities from the private into the public
sector.
Our results show that the higher the predicted satisfaction with the work
itself in the public sector, the higher the probability that an individual will
make the transition from the private to the public sector. Instead, higher
predicted satisfaction with the extrinsic characteristics does not raise the
probability of transition. These results imply that individuals are drawn
to the public sector by the intrinsic characteristics of working in the public
sector rather than the extrinsic benefits, which is consistent with the exis-
tence of PSM evidence. Further, extrinsic rewards crowd out PSM, in that,
higher predicted satisfaction diﬀerentials with the extrinsic characteristics of
the job (i.e. satisfaction with hours of work, satisfaction with job security,
and satisfaction with pay) decrease the likelihood of individuals moving into
the public sector. Women experience crowding out of a greater magnitude
than men. We find similar results by investigating transitions into diﬀerent
occupational classifications and into diﬀerent sub-sectors of the public sector.
The paper also oﬀers some of the first evidence on public sector rents
based on domain satisfaction measures, thus contributing to a growing lit-
erature on public sector rents using subjective well-being measures (see e.g.
Luechinger, Meier, and Stutzer, 2005; Clark and Senik, 2005; and Clark.
2004). Earlier studies on public sector rents focus mainly on wage diﬀeren-
tials (see e.g. Bender 1998).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the
6The use of self-reported satisfaction data has been validated by several researchers.
For example, it has been shown that job satisfaction predicts future quits (Freeman, 1978;
Clark et al. 1998), it is negatively correlated with absenteeism (Clegg, 1983) and that it
is positively correlated with productivity (Mangione and Quinn, 1975). See Diener (2000)
for a review.
7Satisfaction with the work itself has been used as a proxy for the intrinsic utility
derived from a job (Pouliakas and Theodossiou, 2009).
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theoretical foundation of our empirical analysis and it derives the predictions.
Section 3 discusses the empirical methodology whilst section 4 presents the
empirical results. Section 5 concludes with some policy recommendations.
2 Theoretical Foundations
We borrow from Benabou and Tirole (2006) (hereafter BT) for the simple
theoretical framework.8 We consider the behaviour of agents who choose
to work in the public sector. ak denotes the level of pro-social activities
undertaken by each agent in sector k at cost cak and yk denotes the (vector
of) extrinsic rewards, enjoyed by agents in sector k, k = P,G, where k = P
denotes the private sector and k = G denotes the public sector. Extrinsic
rewards include wages, job security and working hours. aˆ ≡ aG− aP denotes
the diﬀerence in pro-social activities between the public and the private sector
whilst yˆ ≡ yG−yP denotes the diﬀerential in extrinsic rewards. We take ak as
given and assume that more pro-social activities are carried out in the public
sector so that aˆ > 0. The sector in which an agent works, the sectorial level of
pro-social activities ak and the extrinsic rewards yk are publicly observable.
Agents diﬀer in two dimensions: their intrinsic valuation for pro-social
activities and their valuation for extrinsic rewards. An agent’s type is then
defined by the intrinsic value ωi ∈ [ω, ω¯] that he attaches to carrying out
1 unit of pro-social activities, where ω may be negative to indicate that an
individual may dislike pro-social activities, and by the value χi ∈ [χ, χˆ] that
he attaches to enjoying 1 unit (in monetary units) of extrinsic rewards. ωi
and χi are random variable with cumulative distribution function H(ωi, χi).
Agents have reputational concerns and wish to appear pro-social/altruistic.
The value of reputation depends linearly on the posterior belief Eωi(ωi|yˆ, k)
of the agent’s type ωi, given the sector k in which the agent works and the
diﬀerential yˆ in extrinsic rewards between the two sectors. The utility of
agent i from working in sector k is
Ui,k = (ωi − c) ak + χiyk + μiEωi(ωi|aˆ, yˆ, k),
8See also Benabou and Tirole (2003).
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where μi ∈ [0, 1] is the weight on reputational concerns, which may change
across individuals.
Initially, agents are randomly allocated between the private and the public
sector. On the job, agents privately learn their type θ = {ωi, χi} and choose
whether to remain in the sector they are in or to move to the other sector,
given ak and yk. Types in the private sector for whom Ui,G ≥ Ui,P , will move
to the public sector; types in the public sector for whom Ui,G < Ui,P will
move to the private sector. Over time, therefore, types will separate between
sectors: those with high intrinsic motivation, i.e., for whom
ωiaˆ+ χiyˆ ≥ ω˜i ≡ caˆ− μR (aˆ, yˆ) ,
where
R(aˆ, yˆ) ≡ Eωi(ωi|aˆ, yˆ, G)− Eωi(ωi|aˆ, yˆ, P )
will be in the public sector, whilst those with low intrinsic motivation, ωi < ω˜,
will be in the private sector. R(aˆ, yˆ) denotes the reputational gain from
working in the public sector compared to the private sector.
Since initially half of the agents are in the private sector, the probability
of transition from the private to the public sector is
p (aˆ, yˆ, μ) =
1
2
Pr (ωiaˆ+ χiyˆ ≥ ω˜i)
Within this framework, BT show as follows:
1. Intrinsic motivation for pro-social activities is an important factor ex-
plaining why people wish to participate to pro-social activities. We
add it that, to the extent that more activities are carried out in the
public sectors, intrinsic motivation helps explaining the desire of people
to work in the public sector. Other things equal, people with higher
intrinsic motivation wish the most to join the public sector.
2. The greater the level of pro-social activities carried out in the public
sector compared to the private sector (and thus aˆ), the more intrinsi-
cally motivated people wish to move to the public sector.
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3. For given level of pro-social activities in the public sector (and thus
aˆ), an increase in extrinsic rewards in the public sector (dyˆ > 0) may
reduce the reputational gain R (aˆ, yˆ) from working in the public sector.
Intuitively, as observers cannot observe agents’ types, a signal extrac-
tion problem arises and an increase in extrinsic rewards generates two
eﬀects on reputation. First, new types are drawn to the public sec-
tor (i.e. ω˜i decreases). The new composition of the public sector thus
comprises fewer intrinsically motivated agents and the ‘good reputa-
tion’ of working in the public sector decreases (as the new members
have lower ωi’s than the old one, they drag down the group reputa-
tion for pro-social orientation). However, the stigma of working in the
private sector also increases (as the members with high ωi’s move to
the public sector). As such the reputational gain R (aˆ, yˆ) of working in
the public sector may increase or decrease (this is the "image spoiling
eﬀect of extrinsic rewards").
4. Because of (3), an increase in extrinsic rewards in the public sector
(dyˆ > 0), may crowd out intrinsic motivation, in the sense that it may
reduce the number of agents who wish to work in the public sector
(dω˜i > 0).
5. To the extent that women care more about their reputation for pro-
social activities than men, crowding out is more likely to occur for
women than for men.
3 Methodology and Data
We use data from the first fourteen waves of the British Household Panel
Survey (BHPS) covering the period 1991-2004. The BHPS is a longitudinal
survey of approximately 10,000 individuals in 5,500 households per year,
providing a rich source of information of demographic and labour market
characteristics, as well as information on individuals’ subjective evaluation
of their jobs and their economic situation. Restricting the sample to full-
time workers between the ages of 16 and 65 results in 37384 and 25728
person-year observations for men and women respectively. Crucially, the
8
panel nature of the data allows us to identify, during the sample period, 747
transitions from the private to the public sector, all initiated by the workers
themselves voluntarily (i.e. quits), with no intervening unemployment or
inactivity spells.
In order to explore whether such transitions are driven or explained by
PSM, we classify job attributes observed prior to and after each transition as
intrinsic or as extrinsic. To make such a distinction operational, we consider
wages, job tenure and hours of work to be extrinsic rewards, while the nature
of the work itself to be an intrinsic reward. We take the view that individuals
have a predetermined level of PSM, which is the result of environmental
factors, such as parental modelling and socialization within social groups
that individuals interact with or are part of. Because it is diﬃcult to measure
individuals’ motives directly, we proxy such motives by using self-reported
domain job satisfaction scores. Following the theoretical model in Section
2, we expect that satisfaction with intrinsic rewards is positively correlated
with the probability of transition into the public sector. In contrast, due to
reputational eﬀects, satisfaction with extrinsic rewards should have little or
even negative influence on individuals’ decision to seek employment in the
public sector.
More formally, the probability that individual i makes the transition into
the public sector can be written as
Pr(MGit = 1) = Pr[β
0XPi,t−1 + εit > 0] (1)
In (1), MGit is an observed indicator variable taking the value 1 if an
individual i moves into the public sector at time t and 0 otherwise. The
vector XPi,t−1 represents individual and labour market characteristics at time
t− 1, the year prior to making the transition.9 It includes expected earnings
diﬀerentials between the public and the private sector as well as expected
satisfaction diﬀerentials for the various extrinsic and intrinsic job attributes
under consideration.10 εit is a random error term.
9Full list of individual and labour variables used given in the appendix.
10These are the ωi(aG − aP ) and (1− ωi)(yG − yP ) in the theoretical model.
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We use satisfaction with the work itself as a proxy of utility derived
from intrinsic rewards of a job. We use satisfaction with pay, job security
and working hours as proxies for utilities derived from extrinsic rewards.11
Earnings in both private and public sector employment are observed only
for those in private employment and public employment respectively, and
they are censored at zero. Because of this, firstly we estimate standard
Mincer-type earnings functions corrected for selectivity bias (we give full
results in the appendix) for men, women, and both men and women com-
bined. Secondly, we use these estimates to calculate the expected earnings
diﬀerential between the public and private sector yˆit for each individual in
our sample, irrespective of current status. Finally, these expected earnings
diﬀerentials are then used when estimating equation (1), the transition into
the public sector equation. In a similar fashion, we estimate diﬀerentials
for satisfaction with pay sˆit(PAY ) = SˆGit(PAY ) − SˆPit(PAY ), satisfaction with
job security sˆit(SEC) = SˆGit(SEC) − SˆPit(SEC), satisfaction with hours worked
sˆit(HOURS) = SˆGit(HOURS) − SˆPit(HOURS), and satisfaction with the work itself
(an intrinsic reward) sˆit(WORK) = SˆGit(WORK) − SˆPit(WORK) between the public
and private sectors.12 These predicted domain satisfaction diﬀerentials enter
as additional regressors in the transition equation (1), which is written as,
Pr(MGit = 1) = α0+α1yˆit+α2sˆit(PAY )+α3sˆit(SEC)+α4sˆit(HOURS)+α5sˆit(WORK)+β
0XPi,t−1+εit
(2)
The main hypothesis that PSM increases the probability of transition
into the public sector implies a positive and significant coeﬃcient α5. If ex-
trinsic rewards exert little or no influence on individuals’ decision to become
public sector employees, then the coeﬃcients α1 to α4 will be statistically
insignificant. Negative and statistically significant coeﬃcients α1 to α4 are
consistent with the crowding out hypothesis, whereby extrinsic rewards mit-
igate an individual’s utility from the intrinsic rewards associated with the
transition into the public sector.
We expand on our analysis by testing our hypothesis on transitions from
the public to the private sector. This will allow us to gain a comparative
11Summary statistics are given in Table 1.
12We use the combined (men and women) earnings and satisfaction functions, and dif-
ferentials for estimations where we observe too few transitions by gender.
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perspective of the motivations for transition between the two sectors. In
this case we calculate yˆ0it = yˆ0Pit − yˆ0Git . We use the same procedure for the
satisfaction diﬀerentials. This allows us to use the same hypothesis from
equation (2) with the same signs.
In addition, we expand our analysis by testing our hypothesis on transi-
tion into caring and non-caring jobs and transition into diﬀerent government
sub-sectors.13 Finally, we investigate whether the income levels of individuals
aﬀect their motivation to move to the public sector by testing our hypothesis
on the lower and upper quartiles of real wages.
4 Results
We begin by examining the number of transitions between the sectors in table
2. We observe that more women enter into caring jobs in the public sector
when compared to entering non-caring jobs in the public sector. This is the
opposite for men entering into the public sector, with more men entering
into non-caring jobs than caring jobs. There are more individuals moving
into non-caring jobs than caring jobs for both men and women moving into
the private sector. Taking the view that the public sector oﬀers more op-
portunity to carry out pro-social actions, these results suggest an important
gender diﬀerence between men and women, that women are more pro-socially
motivated than men (Cronson and Gneezy, 2009).
[Insert Table 2 here.]
Table 3 shows that on average the public sector has higher extrinsic re-
wards than the public sector. The real wage is on average significantly higher
in the public sector than in the private sector for both men and women.
Working hours are significantly less in the public sector than in the pri-
vate sector (for both men and women). Public sector workers (both men
and women) have significantly longer job tenure than private sector workers.
13Caring refers to health, education, and social care. Non-caring refers to all other
industries (Gregg, et al, 2009).
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This suggests that the public sector oﬀers better job security than the pri-
vate sector.14 These results are important because they show that the public
sector has higher extrinsic rewards than the private sector on average. This
means there is scope for our theoretical model and its predictions. That is,
the public sector having higher extrinsic rewards may reduce the reputational
(for being pro-social) benefit for making the transition to the public sector
because the high extrinsic rewards in the public sector make it harder to
diﬀerentiate whether an individual’s motive for moving to the public sector
are to fulfill pro-social motivations or to satisfy extrinsic desires.
[Insert Table 3 here.]
We now examine the results that make use of observed transition into
the public sector. Table 4 below gives the probit estimations for transition
from the private to the public sector for men and women. In order to gain
a comparative perspective, Table 4 also includes results for transition from
the public to the private sector for both men and women.
[Insert Table 4 here]
There is strong evidence for our main hypothesis: individuals are more
likely to move to public sector if they expect to enjoy greater satisfaction
with the work itself in the public sector. Furthermore, higher predicted
satisfaction with pay in the public sector will reduce the probability of moving
to the public sector, thus providing evidence of the image spoiling eﬀect of
monetary rewards in the public sector. The satisfaction with job security
diﬀerential is insignificant for men, but is positive and significant for women.
This suggests that job security is important for women when choosing a job.
This is reinforced as the job security satisfaction diﬀerential is positive and
significant for transition into the private sector as well. However, for men this
provides evidence that men are not more likely to join the public service out
of a desire to derive greater utility from job security. There is strong evidence
that higher (predicted) utility with the number of hours worked in the public
14This is consistent with previous studies. See e.g. Rama (1999) and Bender (1998).
12
sector in fact it reduces the probability of joining the public sector for both
men and women. Thus, the results of the predicted satisfaction with pay and
working hours diﬀerentials are consistent with the crowding out hypothesis,
whereby extrinsic rewards mitigate an individual’s utility from the intrinsic
rewards associated with the transition into the public sector.
This grouping of results shows that people join the public sector mainly
because it oﬀers individuals with PSM the opportunity to carry out pro-
social activities. Higher wages or better extrinsic rewards are not the driving
force behind the transition. In fact, our results show that higher extrinsic
rewards in the public sector crowd out PSM in the public service, i.e. make it
less likely for individuals who are public service motivated to join the public
sector.
These findings are reinforced when we compare them to our findings for
transition into the private sector from the public sector. We find that the
satisfaction with the work itself diﬀerential is insignificant for both men and
women. This means that individuals are not attracted by the intrinsic aspects
of work in the private sector. Instead, the wage, satisfaction with job security,
and satisfaction with working hours diﬀerential are positive and significant
for women. The satisfaction with job security diﬀerential is positive and
significant for men. This clearly shows that a move to the private sector
is more likely the greater the utility derived from extrinsic rewards in the
private sector. Therefore the move to the private sector is motivated by
extrinsic rewards, whereas the move from the private to the public sector is
motivated by intrinsic rewards (and mitigated by extrinsic rewards).
Table 5 contains probit estimation results for transition into caring and
non-caring jobs in the public and private sectors.15 The results for transition
into both caring and non-caring jobs in the public sector confirm our hy-
potheses. Transition into both caring and non-caring jobs is more likely the
greater the satisfaction with work diﬀerential, i.e. the greater the amount of
satisfaction derived from intrinsic aspects of work in the public sector whereas
extrinsic rewards mitigate this probability. We find similar results when we
investigate transition into diﬀerent sub-sectors of the government in Table 6.
15These results are from a combined sample of both men and women.
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In this case, the crowding out is of greatest magnitude for transition into the
NHS and higher education. This is perhaps because these sub-sectors have
a high proportion of caring jobs.
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 here.]
Finally we test whether the crowding out eﬀect is aﬀected by income.
We give results for probit estimations for individuals that were in the lower
quartile of earnings before the transition and individuals in the upper quartile
of earnings in Table 7. These results show that there is a greater amount
of crowding out for individuals with lower incomes. This is because both
the satisfaction with pay and working hours diﬀerentials are negative and
significant. However, the satisfaction with job security diﬀerential is positive
and significant. This suggests that job security is important for individuals
with low levels of income. There is no crowding out for individuals with
higher income. However, transition into the public sector is still driven by
satisfaction from the intrinsic aspects of working in the public sector as the
satisfaction with work itself diﬀerential is positive and nearly significant at
a 10% confidence level.
[Insert Table 7 here.]
5 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
Our results show that higher wages, satisfaction with pay, job security and
working hours in the public sector are either insignificant in influencing the
probability of transition to the public sector or reduce this probability. In-
stead, higher satisfaction with the intrinsic characteristics of work in the
public sector increases the probability of transition to the public sector. In-
dividuals are more likely to move due to higher satisfaction with the work
itself in the public sector, as the public sector provides greater opportunity
for these individuals to carry out their public service motivation. This group-
ing of results provides strong evidence of PSM and suggests that extrinsic
rewards may crowd out intrinsic motivation.
14
These results suggest that from an eﬃciency point of view, the public
sector should lower wages and other extrinsic rewards for two reasons. Firstly,
high wages in the public sector deter individuals with PSM from entering the
public sector as high wages decrease their utility from this pro-social move
because they are perceived to be “greedy”. Therefore lower wages and other
extrinsic rewards allow for better matching as individuals with PSM will be
more willing to work in the public sector. Secondly, a reduction in wages and
other extrinsic rewards will reduce problems of adverse selection in hiring
new workers for the public sector. High wages in the public sector will also
attract individuals who do not have PSM. These individuals require higher
powered incentives to perform the same task compared to individuals with
high levels of PSM and therefore are more costly than individuals with PSM.
By oﬀering lower wages the public sector will attract a higher proportion of
individuals with PSM.
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Table 2 
 Number of observations of Transitions 
 Observations 
 Males Females 
   
Entry into Public Sector from Private 
Sector 
336 411 
Entry into Caring Public Sector from 
Private Sector 
59 185 
Entry into Non Caring Public Sector from 
Private Sector 
162 95 
Entry into Private Sector from Public 
Sector 
349 310 
Entry into Caring Private Sector from 
Public Sector 
24 86 
Entry into Non Caring Private Sector 
from Public Sector 
241 135 
   
 
 
Table 1 
The Distribution of Job Satisfaction Measures 
 
MALES 
 
Overall Job 
Satisfaction 
Satisfaction 
With The Work 
Itself 
Satisfaction 
With Pay 
Satisfaction 
With Job 
Security 
Satisfaction 
With Hours 
Worked 
 
Rank 
Count % Count  % Count % Count % Count % 
1 684 1.92 685 1.92 1,705 4.79 1,463 4.12 977 2.74 
2 1,150 3.23 995 2.79 2,037 5.72 1,290 3.63 1,328 3.73 
3 2,837 7.97 2,377 6.68 5,413 15.20 2,871 8.08 3,973 11.16 
4 3,511 9.86 3,318 9.32 3,528 9.91 3,639 10.24 4,724 13.27 
5 8,502 23.88 7,588 21.31 8,979 25.22 6,746 18.98 8,003 22.47 
6 15,223 42.76 14,614 41.05 11,374 31.95 12,365 34.79 12,282 34.49 
7 3,693 10.37 6,027 16.93 2,568 7.21 7,166 20.16 4,324 12.14 
Total 35,600 100.00 35,604 100.00 35,604 100.00 35,540 100.00 35,611 100.00 
 
FEMALES 
 
Overall Job 
Satisfaction 
Satisfaction 
With The Work 
Itself 
Satisfaction 
With Pay 
Satisfaction 
With Job 
Security 
Satisfaction 
With Hours 
Worked 
 
Rank 
Count % Count  % Count % Count % Count % 
1 444 1.75 449 1.77 1,168 4.60 868 3.42 542 2.13 
2 708 2.79 673 2.65 1,477 5.82 655 2.58 785 3.09 
3 1,691 6.66 1,608 6.33 3,791 14.93 1,700 6.70 2,930 11.53 
4 1,642 6.47 1,712 6.74 2,023 7.97 1,828 7.21 2,369 9.32 
5 5,566 21.92 5,206 20.49 6,198 24.41 4,308 16.99 5,718 22.51 
6 11,803 46.48 10,819 42.58 8,390 33.04 9,478 37.38 9,284 36.54 
7 3,542 13.95 4,939 19.44 2,348 9.25 6,519 25.71 3,777 14.87 
Total 25,396 100.00 25,406 100.00 25,395 100.00 25,356 100.00 25,405 100.00 
 1 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
 Number of observations of Transitions 
 Means T-stat on Sector 
Difference 
 Public Private  
    
Real Wage (£/month)    
Men  1848 1688 10.69*** 
Women 1494 1131 34.19*** 
    
Hours Worked (weekly)    
Men 38.72 40.68 -22.02*** 
Women 35.83 37.09 -17.79*** 
    
Job Tenure (years)    
Men 6.42 4.56 21.25*** 
Women 4.99 3.45 22.02*** 
    
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
Table 4 
Probit results for transition into Public and Private Sectors  
 Public Private+ 
 Males Females Males Females 
     
ityˆ  -1.437* (0.832) -1.185** (0.571) 0.239 (1.010) 1.738** (0.747) 
)(ˆ PAYits  -0.474 (0.354) -0.024 (0.183) -0.661 (0.411) 0.043 (0.227) 
)(ˆ SECits  -0.223 (0.238) 0.312* (0.163) 0.677** (0.288) 0.475** (0.230) 
)(ˆ WORKits  0.591*** (0.221) 0.818** (0.320) -0.001 (0.248) -0.413 (0.447) 
)(ˆ HOURSits  -0.727** (0.317) -0.606*** (0.236) 0.287 (0.347) 0.846*** (0.328) 
Employer offers Pension (t) 0.265* (0.150) 0.250 (0.175) 0.367** (0.172) -0.093 (0.224) 
Age (t-1) 0.003 (0.005) 0.002 (0.004) -0.007 (0.005) -0.008 (0.006) 
Pension (t-1) -0.221*** (0.059) -0.267*** (0.061) -0.337*** (0.078) -0.310*** (0.076) 
Trade Union Member (t-1) -0.072 (0.075) 0.258*** (0.077) 0.136* (0.082) 0.263*** (0.082) 
Married (t-1) -0.269*** (0.087) -0.230*** (0.086) -0.051 (0.100) -0.145 (0.108) 
Living as Couple (t-1) -0.167* (0.088) -0.182** (0.081) -0.159 (0.109) 0.049 (0.100) 
Widowed (t-1) 0.025 (0.427) -0.394 (0.332) 0.196 (0.528) -0.451 (0.331) 
Divorced (t-1) 0.093 (0.172) -0.117 (0.128) 0.057 (0.187) -0.073 (0.148) 
Higher Level Edu (t-1) 0.043 (0.078) 0.256** (0.116) -0.032 (0.100) -0.198 (0.155) 
Medium Level Edu (t-1) 0.103 (0.076) 0.143 (0.098) -0.034 (0.101) -0.091 (0.125) 
Health Problems (t-1) -0.012 (0.050) 0.144*** (0.053) -0.039 (0.060) 0.192*** (0.064) 
No. of Children (t-1)  0.087*** (0.033) 0.066* (0.036) 0.023 (0.040) 0.026 (0.041) 
Renter (t-1) 0.116 (0.073) 0.244*** (0.090) 0.164* (0.097) 0.045 (0.125) 
Medium Firm (t-1) -0.047 (0.068) -0.084 (0.067) 0.160* (0.094) 0.187** (0.093) 
Large Firm (t-1)  -0.111 (0.075) -0.276*** (0.078) 0.291*** (0.095) 0.193* (0.099) 
Regional Dummies (t-1) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant -2.956*** (0.695) -3.739*** (0.420) -1.972** (0.826) -2.189*** (0.595) 
Pseudo R2 0.074 0.105 0.084 0.115 
The standard errors are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% 
confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level. Note on differential*****. + 
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Table 5 
Probit results for Transition – Caring and Non Caring Jobs (Men and Women) 
 Public 
 Caring Non Caring 
   
ityˆ  -0.033 (0.985) 0.372 (0.844) 
)(ˆ PAYits  -0.517** (0.251) -0.668*** (0.229) 
)(ˆ SECits  0.309 (0.227) 0.328 (0.204) 
)(ˆ WORKits  1.166*** (0.389) 1.347*** (0.366) 
)(ˆ HOURSits  -1.047*** (0.359) -1.020*** (0.320) 
   
The standard errors are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% 
confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Probit results for Transition – Government Sub-sectors (Men And Women) 
 Central Government Local Government NHS And Higher Education 
    
ityˆ  -0.158 (1.115) -0.637 (0.917) -0.634 (0.978) 
)(ˆ PAYits  -0.447 (0.301) 0.380 (0.243) -0.892*** (0.246) 
)(ˆ SECits  0.374 (0.266) -0.216 (0.220) 0.261 (0.221) 
)(ˆ WORKits  1.463*** (0.485) 1.402*** (0.371) 0.745* (0.384) 
)(ˆ HOURSits  -0.788* (0.413) -0.891*** (0.342) -1.260*** (0.356) 
    
The standard errors are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% 
confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level. 
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Table 7 
Probit results for Transition into Public Sector– Income (Men and Women) 
 Lowest 25th Percentile  
(<£910.00/month) 
Highest 25th Percentile  
(>£1833.33/month) 
   
ityˆ  -1.428 (1.237) 0.668 (1.353) 
)(ˆ PAYits  -0.655** (0.325) -0.397 (0.368) 
)(ˆ SECits  0.703** (0.308) 0.187 (0.323) 
)(ˆ WORKits  1.304** (0.530) 0.967
^ (0.592) 
)(ˆ HOURSits  -1.084** (0.489) -0.604 (0.489) 
   
The standard errors are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% 
confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level. ^ indicates significance at a 10.2% confidence level.  
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Table A1 
Log Wage Equations with Heckman Selection  
 Public Private 
 Males Females Males Females 
     
Age 0.005*** (0.002) 0.009*** (0.001) 0.009*** (0.000) 0.007*** (0.001) 
Trade Union Member -0.173 (0.127) 0.337*** (0.041) 0.069*** (0.025) 0.040 (0.037) 
Employer Offers Pension  -0.058 (0.050) 0.139*** (0.028) 0.176*** (0.007) 0.258*** (0.012) 
Married 0.216*** (0.026) -0.041*** (0.013) 0.207*** (0.009) 0.049*** (0.010) 
Living as Couple 0.151*** (0.029) -0.021 (0.016) 0.170*** (0.009) 0.086*** (0.011) 
Widowed 0.124 (0.094) -0.041 (0.036) 0.107*** (0.039) -0.104*** (0.035) 
Divorced 0.120*** (0.030) -0.025 (0.019) 0.185*** (0.017) 0.086*** (0.017) 
Higher Level Education 0.254*** (0.075) 0.679*** (0.036) 0.367*** (0.011) 0.429*** (0.021) 
Medium Level Education 0.083** (0.041) 0.280*** (0.023) 0.138*** (0.008) 0.189*** (0.012) 
Health Problems -0.018* (0.011) -0.007 (0.009) -0.031*** (0.005) -0.042*** (0.007) 
No. of Children 0.054*** (0.007) 0.028*** (0.007) 0.058*** (0.003) -0.009* (0.006) 
Renter -0.215*** (0.021) -0.202*** (0.018) -0.229*** (0.008) -0.209*** (0.011) 
Medium Firm -0.013 (0.031) 0.063*** (0.019) 0.089*** (0.007) 0.091*** (0.009) 
Large Firm 0.031 (0.035) 0.091*** (0.013) 0.167*** (0.008) 0.170*** (0.010) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.805*** (0.417) 1.254*** (0.145) 1.903*** (0.016) 1.669*** (0.024) 
     
Age 0.012*** (0.001) 0.022*** (0.001) -0.012*** (0.001) -0.022*** (0.001) 
Trade Union Member 0.992*** (0.019) 1.150*** (0.021) -0.969*** (0.019) -1.144*** (0.021) 
Employer offers Pension 0.320*** (0.023) 0.531*** (0.024) -0.218*** (0.022) -0.480*** (0.024) 
Married -0.167*** (0.028) -0.065** (0.028) 0.152*** (0.027) 0.073*** (0.027) 
Living as Couple -0.169*** (0.031) -0.157*** (0.031) 0.158*** (0.031) 0.153*** (0.031) 
Widowed -0.374*** (0.131) 0.205** (0.084) 0.359*** (0.127) -0.171** (0.083) 
Divorced 0.076 (0.049) -0.052 (0.043) -0.072 (0.048) 0.065 (0.043) 
Higher Level Education 0.578*** (0.025) 0.933*** (0.029) -0.439*** (0.024) -0.851*** (0.028) 
Medium Level Education 0.292*** (0.026) 0.428*** (0.029) -0.151*** (0.026) -0.346*** (0.028) 
Health Problems -0.001 (0.017) 0.042** (0.019) 0.004 (0.017) -0.035* (0.019) 
No. of Children 0.032*** (0.010) 0.126*** (0.012) -0.032*** (0.010) -0.127*** (0.012) 
Renter -0.048 (0.030) -0.146*** (0.033) 0.071** (0.030) 0.173*** (0.033) 
Medium Firm 0.211*** (0.023) 0.125*** (0.024) -0.232*** (0.023) -0.126*** (0.024) 
Large Firm 0.245*** (0.024) 0.189*** (0.025) -0.271*** (0.023) -0.197*** (0.025) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -2.106*** (0.054) -2.472*** (0.062) 1.877*** (0.054) 2.308*** (0.061) 
     
Mills Ratio -0.382** (0.174) 0.261*** (0.059) -0.225*** (0.057) -0.102* (0.053) 
     
The standard errors are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% 
confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level. 
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Table A2 
Satisfaction with Work Itself Equations with Heckman Selection  
 Public Private 
 Males Females Males Females 
     
Age -0.003 (0.006) -0.005* (0.003) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.002) 
Trade Union Member -1.336*** (0.430) -0.203 (0.131) -0.344*** (0.082) -0.461*** (0.118) 
Employer Offers Pension  -0.321* (0.170) -0.089 (0.089) 0.019 (0.021) -0.111*** (0.039) 
Married 0.049 (0.091) 0.272*** (0.039) 0.174*** (0.029) 0.095*** (0.034) 
Living as Couple -0.047 (0.100) 0.028 (0.049) 0.047 (0.029) 0.019 (0.036) 
Widowed 0.924*** (0.333) 0.476*** (0.100) 0.279** (0.125) 0.272** (0.113) 
Divorced -0.296*** (0.108) 0.129** (0.058) 0.230*** (0.053) -0.018 (0.053) 
Higher Level Education -0.609** (0.254) -0.205* (0.112) -0.083** (0.034) -0.194*** (0.069) 
Medium Level Education -0.377*** (0.142) -0.125* (0.071) -0.062*** (0.024) -0.083** (0.038) 
Health Problems -0.215*** (0.038) -0.157*** (0.026) -0.115*** (0.017) -0.119*** (0.023) 
No. of Children 0.003 (0.026) 0.045** (0.020) 0.020** (0.010) 0.047*** (0.018) 
Renter 0.121 (0.074) 0.086 (0.055) 0.019 (0.026) 0.087** (0.037) 
Medium Firm -0.277*** (0.107) -0.116*** (0.036) -0.226*** (0.023) -0.219*** (0.028) 
Large Firm -0.399*** (0.121) -0.202*** (0.040) -0.291*** (0.027) -0.385*** (0.033) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 9.059*** (1.412) 6.183*** (0.458) 5.356*** (0.052) 5.421*** (0.076) 
     
Age 0.012*** (0.001) 0.022*** (0.001) -0.012*** (0.001) -0.022*** (0.001) 
Trade Union Member 0.992*** (0.019) 1.150*** (0.021) -0.970*** (0.019) -1.144*** (0.021) 
Employer offers Pension 0.322*** (0.023) 0.532*** (0.024) -0.217*** (0.022) -0.480*** (0.024) 
Married -0.167*** (0.028) -0.065** (0.028) 0.153*** (0.027) 0.073*** (0.027) 
Living as Couple -0.169*** (0.031) -0.157*** (0.031) 0.158*** (0.031) 0.153*** (0.031) 
Widowed -0.373*** (0.131) 0.205** (0.084) 0.361*** (0.127) -0.171** (0.083) 
Divorced 0.076 (0.049) -0.051 (0.043) -0.070 (0.048) 0.065 (0.043) 
Higher Level Education 0.579*** (0.025) 0.933*** (0.029) -0.439*** (0.024) -0.851*** (0.028) 
Medium Level Education 0.292*** (0.026) 0.428*** (0.029) -0.152*** (0.026) -0.346*** (0.028) 
Health Problems -0.001 (0.017) 0.043** (0.019) 0.004 (0.017) -0.035* (0.019) 
No. of Children 0.031*** (0.010) 0.125*** (0.013) -0.032*** (0.010) -0.127*** (0.012) 
Renter -0.047 (0.030) -0.146*** (0.033) 0.071** (0.030) 0.173*** (0.033) 
Medium Firm 0.211*** (0.023) 0.125*** (0.024) -0.233*** (0.023) -0.126*** (0.024) 
Large Firm 0.246*** (0.024) 0.189*** (0.025) -0.271*** (0.023) -0.197*** (0.025) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -2.107*** (0.054) -2.472*** (0.062) 1.877*** (0.054) 2.308*** (0.061) 
     
Mills Ratio -1.677*** (0.587) -0.149 (0.189) 0.282 (0.186) 0.447*** (0.169) 
     
The standard errors are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% 
confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level. 
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Table A3 
Satisfaction with Pay Equations with Heckman Selection  
 Public Private 
 Males Females Males Females 
     
Age 0.013** (0.006) 0.010*** (0.003) 0.003** (0.001) 0.005** (0.002) 
Trade Union Member -0.267 (0.502) 0.337** (0.160) 0.045 (0.095) -0.306** (0.138) 
Employer Offers Pension  0.183 (0.197) 0.553*** (0.109) 0.297*** (0.025) 0.204*** (0.046) 
Married -0.048 (0.098) 0.093* (0.048) 0.112*** (0.033) 0.198*** (0.040) 
Living as Couple -0.044 (0.108) -0.048 (0.060) 0.011 (0.034) 0.092** (0.042) 
Widowed 0.595* (0.344) 0.176 (0.126) 0.122 (0.145) 0.160 (0.133) 
Divorced -0.166 (0.106) -0.380*** (0.073) 0.108* (0.061) -0.178*** (0.063) 
Higher Level Education 0.220 (0.293) 0.172 (0.138) 0.220*** (0.040) -0.014 (0.081) 
Medium Level Education 0.077 (0.161) -0.054 (0.087) 0.025 (0.028) 0.094** (0.044) 
Health Problems -0.167*** (0.038) -0.048 (0.033) -0.129*** (0.019) -0.197*** (0.027) 
No. of Children 0.042 (0.026) 0.126*** (0.025) 0.009 (0.011) 0.010 (0.021) 
Renter -0.281*** (0.077) -0.173** (0.068) -0.187*** (0.031) -0.077* (0.043) 
Medium Firm -0.129 (0.121) 0.111** (0.045) -0.094*** (0.027) -0.095*** (0.033) 
Large Firm -0.184 (0.136) -0.095* (0.050) 0.048 (0.031) 0.022 (0.039) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 4.614*** (1.647) 3.102*** (0.562) 4.663*** (0.060) 4.255*** (0.089) 
     
Age 0.012*** (0.001) 0.022*** (0.001) -0.012*** (0.001) -0.022*** (0.001) 
Trade Union Member 0.992*** (0.019) 1.149*** (0.021) -0.970*** (0.019) -1.144*** (0.021) 
Employer offers Pension 0.320*** (0.023) 0.534*** (0.024) -0.216*** (0.022) -0.479*** (0.024) 
Married -0.167*** (0.028) -0.064** (0.028) 0.153*** (0.027) 0.073*** (0.027) 
Living as Couple -0.169*** (0.031) -0.156*** (0.031) 0.159*** (0.031) 0.153*** (0.031) 
Widowed -0.374*** (0.131) 0.207** (0.084) 0.361*** (0.127) -0.171** (0.083) 
Divorced 0.076 (0.049) -0.050 (0.043) -0.071 (0.048) 0.064 (0.043) 
Higher Level Education 0.578*** (0.025) 0.935*** (0.029) -0.440*** (0.024) -0.851*** (0.028) 
Medium Level Education 0.292*** (0.026) 0.429*** (0.029) -0.151*** (0.026) -0.346*** (0.028) 
Health Problems -0.001 (0.017) 0.042** (0.019) 0.004 (0.017) -0.035* (0.019) 
No. of Children 0.032*** (0.010) 0.126*** (0.013) -0.032*** (0.010) -0.127*** (0.012) 
Renter -0.048 (0.030) -0.147*** (0.033) 0.071** (0.030) 0.173*** (0.033) 
Medium Firm 0.211*** (0.023) 0.124*** (0.024) -0.233*** (0.023) -0.126*** (0.024) 
Large Firm 0.245*** (0.024) 0.189*** (0.025) -0.271*** (0.023) -0.197*** (0.025) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -2.106*** (0.054) -2.477*** (0.062) 1.877*** (0.054) 2.308*** (0.061) 
     
Mills Ratio -0.329 (0.688) 0.626*** (0.231) -0.424** (0.215) 0.437** (0.199) 
     
The standard errors are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% 
confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level. 
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Table A4 
Satisfaction with Job Security Equations with Heckman Selection  
 Public Private 
 Males Females Males Females 
     
Age 0.005 (0.006) -0.002 (0.003) -0.013*** (0.001) -0.009*** (0.002) 
Trade Union Member 0.065 (0.517) -0.063 (0.153) -0.533*** (0.094) -0.805*** (0.129) 
Employer Offers Pension  0.678*** (0.204) 0.548*** (0.104) 0.229*** (0.025) -0.001 (0.043) 
Married -0.128 (0.101) 0.148*** (0.045) 0.064* (0.033) 0.084** (0.037) 
Living as Couple 0.010 (0.111) 0.079 (0.057) 0.041 (0.034) 0.089** (0.040) 
Widowed 0.510 (0.351) -0.057 (0.118) -0.138 (0.144) 0.079 (0.127) 
Divorced -0.029 (0.109) -0.060 (0.068) 0.026 (0.061) -0.087 (0.059) 
Higher Level Education 0.204 (0.301) 0.123 (0.132) -0.291*** (0.039) -0.225*** (0.076) 
Medium Level Education 0.045 (0.165) 0.079 (0.083) -0.152*** (0.028) 0.013 (0.042) 
Health Problems -0.147*** (0.039) -0.098*** (0.031) -0.102*** (0.019) -0.118*** (0.025) 
No. of Children 0.065** (0.027) -0.024 (0.024) -0.022** (0.011) -0.036* (0.020) 
Renter -0.183** (0.079) -0.231*** (0.064) -0.017 (0.030) 0.123*** (0.041) 
Medium Firm 0.161 (0.124) -0.017 (0.042) -0.233*** (0.027) -0.241*** (0.031) 
Large Firm -0.082 (0.140) -0.048 (0.047) -0.311*** (0.031) -0.430*** (0.037) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 4.841*** (1.694) 5.500*** (0.535) 5.904*** (0.060) 5.914*** (0.085) 
     
Age 0.012*** (0.001) 0.022*** (0.001) -0.012*** (0.001) -0.022*** (0.001) 
Trade Union Member 0.993*** (0.019) 1.150*** (0.021) -0.969*** (0.019) -1.145*** (0.021) 
Employer offers Pension 0.322*** (0.023) 0.533*** (0.024) -0.217*** (0.022) -0.479*** (0.024) 
Married -0.166*** (0.028) -0.064** (0.028) 0.152*** (0.027) 0.074*** (0.027) 
Living as Couple -0.168*** (0.031) -0.157*** (0.031) 0.159*** (0.031) 0.153*** (0.031) 
Widowed -0.371*** (0.131) 0.207** (0.084) 0.363*** (0.127) -0.176** (0.084) 
Divorced 0.078 (0.049) -0.049 (0.043) -0.071 (0.048) 0.065 (0.043) 
Higher Level Education 0.578*** (0.025) 0.935*** (0.029) -0.439*** (0.024) -0.849*** (0.028) 
Medium Level Education 0.292*** (0.026) 0.430*** (0.029) -0.150*** (0.026) -0.345*** (0.028) 
Health Problems -0.001 (0.017) 0.043** (0.019) 0.004 (0.017) -0.035* (0.019) 
No. of Children 0.031*** (0.010) 0.125*** (0.013) -0.032*** (0.010) -0.127*** (0.012) 
Renter -0.049 (0.030) -0.146*** (0.033) 0.070** (0.030) 0.174*** (0.033) 
Medium Firm 0.210*** (0.023) 0.123*** (0.024) -0.233*** (0.023) -0.126*** (0.024) 
Large Firm 0.245*** (0.024) 0.188*** (0.025) -0.271*** (0.023) -0.198*** (0.025) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -2.104*** (0.054) -2.471*** (0.062) 1.878*** (0.054) 2.307*** (0.061) 
     
Mills Ratio -0.039 (0.708) -0.172 (0.221) 0.506** (0.213) 0.673*** (0.185) 
     
The standard errors are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% 
confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level. 
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Table A5 
Satisfaction with Hours Worked Equations with Heckman Selection  
 Public Private 
 Males Females Males Females 
     
Age -0.006 (0.006) -0.016*** (0.003) -0.001 (0.001) -0.003 (0.002) 
Trade Union Member -0.850* (0.461) -0.637*** (0.149) -0.057 (0.089) -0.296** (0.122) 
Employer Offers Pension  0.009 (0.182) -0.002 (0.101) 0.039* (0.023) -0.082** (0.041) 
Married -0.149 (0.092) 0.129*** (0.044) -0.062** (0.031) -0.110*** (0.035) 
Living as Couple -0.089 (0.101) 0.100* (0.056) -0.136*** (0.032) -0.049 (0.037) 
Widowed 0.876*** (0.323) 0.045 (0.116) 0.381*** (0.135) 0.196* (0.117) 
Divorced -0.060 (0.101) 0.035 (0.067) 0.003 (0.057) -0.257*** (0.055) 
Higher Level Education -0.454* (0.269) -0.961*** (0.128) -0.121*** (0.037) -0.310*** (0.071) 
Medium Level Education -0.211 (0.148) -0.346*** (0.080) -0.021 (0.026) -0.061 (0.039) 
Health Problems -0.126*** (0.036) -0.156*** (0.030) -0.101*** (0.018) -0.154*** (0.023) 
No. of Children -0.004 (0.025) -0.057** (0.023) -0.052*** (0.011) -0.012 (0.019) 
Renter 0.025 (0.072) 0.188*** (0.063) 0.011 (0.029) 0.080** (0.038) 
Medium Firm -0.148 (0.111) -0.106** (0.041) -0.070*** (0.025) -0.120*** (0.029) 
Large Firm -0.216* (0.126) -0.049 (0.046) -0.005 (0.029) -0.150*** (0.035) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 7.641*** (1.511) 7.477*** (0.521) 5.395*** (0.056) 5.544*** (0.079) 
     
Age 0.012*** (0.001) 0.022*** (0.001) -0.012*** (0.001) -0.022*** (0.001) 
Trade Union Member 0.992*** (0.019) 1.150*** (0.021) -0.970*** (0.019) -1.145*** (0.021) 
Employer offers Pension 0.321*** (0.023) 0.532*** (0.024) -0.217*** (0.022) -0.480*** (0.024) 
Married -0.166*** (0.028) -0.065** (0.028) 0.152*** (0.027) 0.074*** (0.027) 
Living as Couple -0.169*** (0.031) -0.157*** (0.031) 0.159*** (0.031) 0.152*** (0.031) 
Widowed -0.373*** (0.131) 0.205** (0.084) 0.361*** (0.127) -0.170** (0.083) 
Divorced 0.076 (0.049) -0.051 (0.043) -0.070 (0.048) 0.065 (0.043) 
Higher Level Education 0.578*** (0.025) 0.933*** (0.029) -0.439*** (0.024) -0.850*** (0.028) 
Medium Level Education 0.292*** (0.026) 0.428*** (0.029) -0.151*** (0.026) -0.346*** (0.028) 
Health Problems -0.001 (0.017) 0.043** (0.019) 0.004 (0.017) -0.035* (0.019) 
No. of Children 0.031*** (0.010) 0.126*** (0.013) -0.032*** (0.010) -0.127*** (0.012) 
Renter -0.048 (0.030) -0.146*** (0.033) 0.070** (0.030) 0.173*** (0.033) 
Medium Firm 0.210*** (0.023) 0.125*** (0.024) -0.232*** (0.023) -0.126*** (0.024) 
Large Firm 0.245*** (0.024) 0.189*** (0.025) -0.271*** (0.023) -0.197*** (0.025) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -2.105*** (0.054) -2.471*** (0.062) 1.877*** (0.054) 2.309*** (0.061) 
     
Mills Ratio -0.838 (0.631) -0.487** (0.214) 0.033 (0.203) 0.399** (0.175) 
     
The standard errors are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% 
confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level. 
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Table A6 
Real Wage and Satisfaction Equations with Heckman Selection (Men and Women)  
 Real Wage Satisfaction with Work Itself 
 Public Private Public Private 
     
Age 0.007*** (0.001) 0.009*** (0.000) -0.002 (0.002) 0.005*** (0.001) 
Trade Union Member 0.141** (0.063) 0.020 (0.024) -0.520*** (0.198) -0.362*** (0.074) 
Employer Offers Pension  0.020 (0.032) 0.201*** (0.007) -0.146 (0.101) -0.023 (0.021) 
Married 0.042*** (0.011) 0.135*** (0.007) 0.144*** (0.035) 0.141*** (0.021) 
Living as Couple 0.032** (0.013) 0.119*** (0.007) -0.038 (0.043) 0.033 (0.022) 
Widowed -0.084*** (0.032) -0.091*** (0.028) 0.359*** (0.103) 0.283*** (0.084) 
Divorced 0.003 (0.017) 0.052*** (0.012) -0.040 (0.055) 0.115*** (0.038) 
Higher Level Education 0.468*** (0.042) 0.398*** (0.011) -0.282** (0.133) -0.112*** (0.035) 
Medium Level Education 0.160*** (0.025) 0.142*** (0.007) -0.179** (0.080) -0.064*** (0.021) 
Health Problems -0.026*** (0.007) -0.053*** (0.004) -0.186*** (0.023) -0.117*** (0.014) 
No. of Children 0.052*** (0.004) 0.067*** (0.003) 0.023* (0.013) 0.028*** (0.008) 
Renter -0.202*** (0.014) -0.214*** (0.007) 0.102** (0.045) 0.037* (0.022) 
Medium Firm 0.055*** (0.012) 0.082*** (0.006) -0.140*** (0.037) -0.220*** (0.017) 
Large Firm 0.102*** (0.012) 0.162*** (0.006) -0.225*** (0.038) -0.315*** (0.019) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.893*** (0.200) 1.749*** (0.013) 6.820*** (0.631) 5.375*** (0.040) 
     
Age 0.012*** (0.001) -0.012*** (0.001) 0.012*** (0.001) -0.012*** (0.001) 
Trade Union Member 1.064*** (0.013) -1.050*** (0.013) 1.063*** (0.013) -1.050*** (0.013) 
Employer offers Pension 0.427*** (0.016) -0.348*** (0.016) 0.428*** (0.016) -0.348*** (0.016) 
Married -0.087*** (0.019) 0.084*** (0.019) -0.087*** (0.019) 0.085*** (0.019) 
Living as Couple -0.117*** (0.021) 0.111*** (0.021) -0.118*** (0.021) 0.111*** (0.021) 
Widowed 0.267*** (0.065) -0.238*** (0.064) 0.268*** (0.065) -0.237*** (0.064) 
Divorced 0.148*** (0.031) -0.135*** (0.031) 0.149*** (0.031) -0.134*** (0.031) 
Higher Level Education 0.702*** (0.018) -0.590*** (0.018) 0.703*** (0.018) -0.590*** (0.018) 
Medium Level Education 0.372*** (0.019) -0.258*** (0.019) 0.373*** (0.019) -0.258*** (0.019) 
Health Problems 0.059*** (0.012) -0.054*** (0.012) 0.060*** (0.012) -0.054*** (0.012) 
No. of Children 0.013* (0.007) -0.015** (0.007) 0.013* (0.007) -0.015** (0.007) 
Renter -0.100*** (0.022) 0.124*** (0.022) -0.100*** (0.022) 0.124*** (0.022) 
Medium Firm 0.133*** (0.016) -0.144*** (0.016) 0.133*** (0.016) -0.145*** (0.016) 
Large Firm 0.138*** (0.016) -0.155*** (0.016) 0.139*** (0.016) -0.155*** (0.016) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -2.082*** (0.039) 1.886*** (0.039) -2.082*** (0.039) 1.886*** (0.039) 
     
Mills Ratio -0.009 (0.086) -0.050 (0.044) -0.561** (0.272) 0.290** (0.134) 
     
The standard errors are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% 
confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level. 
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Table A7 
Satisfaction Equations with Heckman Selection (Men and Women)  
 Satisfaction With Pay Satisfaction With Job Security  
 Public Private Public Private 
     
Age 0.014*** (0.003) 0.003*** (0.001) 0.003 (0.003) -0.011*** (0.001) 
Trade Union Member 0.543** (0.237) -0.106 (0.086) 0.234 (0.234) -0.566*** (0.084) 
Employer Offers Pension  0.599*** (0.121) 0.277*** (0.025) 0.746*** (0.119) 0.153*** (0.024) 
Married 0.007 (0.042) 0.157*** (0.025) 0.046 (0.040) 0.066*** (0.024) 
Living as Couple -0.072 (0.052) 0.049* (0.026) 0.050 (0.050) 0.055** (0.025) 
Widowed 0.351*** (0.125) 0.234** (0.097) 0.096 (0.119) -0.007 (0.095) 
Divorced -0.192*** (0.067) -0.020 (0.044) -0.012 (0.064) -0.000 (0.043) 
Higher Level Education 0.488*** (0.160) 0.139*** (0.040) 0.328** (0.157) -0.257*** (0.039) 
Medium Level Education 0.190** (0.096) 0.058** (0.025) 0.170* (0.094) -0.083*** (0.024) 
Health Problems -0.057** (0.028) -0.150*** (0.016) -0.088*** (0.027) -0.103*** (0.015) 
No. of Children 0.054*** (0.015) 0.002 (0.009) 0.003 (0.015) -0.030*** (0.009) 
Renter -0.267*** (0.054) -0.156*** (0.025) -0.253*** (0.052) 0.026 (0.024) 
Medium Firm 0.070 (0.044) -0.103*** (0.020) 0.061 (0.043) -0.226*** (0.019) 
Large Firm -0.078* (0.046) 0.025 (0.022) -0.073* (0.044) -0.335*** (0.022) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.304*** (0.755) 4.491*** (0.047) 4.463*** (0.744) 5.935*** (0.046) 
     
Age 0.012*** (0.001) -0.012*** (0.001) 0.012*** (0.001) -0.012*** (0.001) 
Trade Union Member 1.063*** (0.013) -1.050*** (0.013) 1.064*** (0.013) -1.050*** (0.013) 
Employer offers Pension 0.428*** (0.016) -0.347*** (0.016) 0.428*** (0.016) -0.348*** (0.016) 
Married -0.086*** (0.019) 0.085*** (0.019) -0.085*** (0.019) 0.084*** (0.019) 
Living as Couple -0.117*** (0.021) 0.111*** (0.021) -0.117*** (0.021) 0.111*** (0.021) 
Widowed 0.268*** (0.065) -0.237*** (0.064) 0.269*** (0.065) -0.239*** (0.065) 
Divorced 0.149*** (0.031) -0.134*** (0.031) 0.150*** (0.031) -0.134*** (0.031) 
Higher Level Education 0.703*** (0.018) -0.590*** (0.018) 0.703*** (0.018) -0.589*** (0.018) 
Medium Level Education 0.373*** (0.019) -0.258*** (0.019) 0.373*** (0.019) -0.257*** (0.019) 
Health Problems 0.059*** (0.012) -0.054*** (0.012) 0.060*** (0.012) -0.054*** (0.012) 
No. of Children 0.013* (0.007) -0.015** (0.007) 0.012* (0.007) -0.015** (0.007) 
Renter -0.100*** (0.022) 0.124*** (0.022) -0.101*** (0.022) 0.124*** (0.022) 
Medium Firm 0.133*** (0.016) -0.145*** (0.016) 0.132*** (0.016) -0.145*** (0.016) 
Large Firm 0.138*** (0.016) -0.155*** (0.016) 0.137*** (0.016) -0.155*** (0.016) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -2.084*** (0.039) 1.886*** (0.039) -2.080*** (0.040) 1.887*** (0.039) 
     
Mills Ratio 0.850*** (0.325) -0.008 (0.156) 0.233 (0.321) 0.433*** (0.151) 
     
The standard errors are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% 
confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 12 
 
 
 
 
Table A8 
Satisfaction Equations with Heckman Selection (Men and Women)  
 Satisfaction With Working Hours  
 Public Private   
     
Age -0.011*** (0.003) -0.002** (0.001)   
Trade Union Member -0.779*** (0.219) -0.195** (0.079)   
Employer Offers Pension  -0.012 (0.111) -0.012 (0.023)   
Married 0.013 (0.038) -0.070*** (0.023)   
Living as Couple 0.020 (0.047) -0.090*** (0.024)   
Widowed 0.012 (0.114) 0.323*** (0.090)   
Divorced -0.075 (0.061) -0.102** (0.040)   
Higher Level Education -0.751*** (0.147) -0.207*** (0.037)   
Medium Level Education -0.289*** (0.088) -0.033 (0.023)   
Health Problems -0.168*** (0.026) -0.114*** (0.015)   
No. of Children -0.015 (0.014) -0.051*** (0.009)   
Renter 0.123** (0.049) 0.034 (0.023)   
Medium Firm -0.103** (0.041) -0.093*** (0.018)   
Large Firm -0.069* (0.042) -0.059*** (0.021)   
Regional Dummies Yes Yes   
Constant 7.534*** (0.697) 5.450*** (0.043)   
     
Age 0.012*** (0.001) -0.012*** (0.001)   
Trade Union Member 1.064*** (0.013) -1.050*** (0.013)   
Employer offers Pension 0.427*** (0.016) -0.348*** (0.016)   
Married -0.086*** (0.019) 0.085*** (0.019)   
Living as Couple -0.117*** (0.021) 0.111*** (0.021)   
Widowed 0.268*** (0.065) -0.237*** (0.064)   
Divorced 0.149*** (0.031) -0.134*** (0.031)   
Higher Level Education 0.702*** (0.018) -0.590*** (0.018)   
Medium Level Education 0.372*** (0.019) -0.258*** (0.019)   
Health Problems 0.060*** (0.012) -0.054*** (0.012)   
No. of Children 0.013* (0.007) -0.015** (0.007)   
Renter -0.100*** (0.022) 0.124*** (0.022)   
Medium Firm 0.133*** (0.016) -0.145*** (0.016)   
Large Firm 0.138*** (0.016) -0.155*** (0.016)   
Regional Dummies Yes Yes   
Constant -2.081*** (0.039) 1.886*** (0.039)   
     
Mills Ratio -0.668** (0.300) 0.278* (0.143)   
     
The standard errors are given in brackets (). *** indicates significance at a 1% confidence level, ** indicates significance at a 5% 
confidence level, and * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
